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                                               ABSTRACT 
The thesis of this article is that Feyerabend’s philosophy of science, 
hinged on his pillar of ‘anarchism’ and ‘anything goes’ can serve as 
a challenge for scientific and technological development in Africa.  
Africa has been largely tagged as ‘underdeveloped’ because she 
has failed to chart her own course of scientific development, and 
has somewhat felt satisfied playing the dependent role. This work 
agrees with Feyerabend’s thesis that knowledge (scientific) is a 
local commodity designed to solve local problems.  Using the 
textual and contextual methods we contend that every culture, 
certainly including Africa, can harness her own indigenous 
scientific categories and develop from her own local perspective. 
We reason with Feyerabend that Western science is not sacrosanct, 
nor its method of rationality the only path toward development.  
The work reveals that Feyerabend’s views, though challenging and 
somewhat intriguing, are very congenial to our African experience. 
Thus we conclude by adumbrating some positive implications that 
his views have for the Africans, especially towards scientific and 
even technological development.     
Key words: Feyerabend; Philosophy; Science; African    
Development;   Anything goes; Anarchism                                        
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                                 INTRODUCTION 
 Any discourse on African development, whether from the 
economic, political, religious, scientific or philosophical 
perspective, would always provide an existing challenge and in fact 
an amazing curiosity. This becomes more evident when the 
discourse is in relation to philosophic-scientific issues. But much as 
one strives to negotiate, understand and evaluate such discourse, 
one would seem to find himself talking more about 
underdevelopment even more than development. The implication 
here is that Africa is underdeveloped and therefore, in need of 
development.  
   In this contemporary world, science and its application, 
technology, provide the most important index for distinguishing a 
developed society, country or continent from an undeveloped one. 
Africa has been tagged a third world continent because of her 
underdevelopment status in the sphere of science and technology. 
The reason is that Africa is mainly dependent on the first world 
(Western or developed world) in its scientific and technological 
needs. The corollary here is that scientific categories of the West, 
in whatever shade or colour, whether it is congenial to the African 
world view or not – have been imposed or dumped on the Africans. 
The Africans, satisfied with their dependent status, have sat back 
and swallowed everything from the developed world without 
harnessing their own path to development. Based on this 
demeaning situation, our development rate has often been tied to 
this dependent status. 
   The questions then arise: Can the Africans not harness their own 
mode of scientific development? Must we always follow the 
Western scientific paradigm? Can we not create alternative 
knowledge to modern science? Feyerabend’s philosophy of science 
seems to offer some answers to these questions and many more 
allied ones.  Thus in this article I present Paul Feyerabend’s 
philosophy of science:  a philosophy of science which challenges 
the Africans to wake up, develop in their own ways without 
depending solely on Western scientific paradigm. His philosophy 
of science anchored on his ideas of ‘anarchism’ and ‘anything 
goes’ suggest that modern science and its method of rationality is 
not the one and only method for doing science nor the only route to 
development. The aim of this paper is to dig out those latent or  
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hidden meaning which Feyerabend’s philosophy of science has 
towards development in Africa.  
                 AN EXPOSITION OF FEYERABEND’S PHILOSOPHY 
OF     SCIENCE 
Feyerabend’s Background and Influences 
It is often said that a philosopher’s ideas are to a large extent the 
offshoot of his socio-cultural milieu and the intellectual ferment of 
his time. This appears to be true of Feyerabend, a former Professor 
of philosophy at the University of California and a Professor of 
philosophy of science at the Federal Institute of Technology at 
Zurich. 
   Explaining the origin of his ideas, Feyerabend notes that the 
problem of knowledge and education in a free society struck him 
during his tenure of a state fellowship at the Weiner Institute Zur 
Methdologiscen Erneuerung Des Deutschen Theaters in 1946 
(Science in 107). Here he studied art and theatre. After a year, he 
left for the University of Vienna where he studied history, physics 
and astronomy. He, alongside his other colleagues, founded an 
organization called ‘Kraft circle’ named after his class teacher, 
Victor Kraft, who incidentally became the chairman of the 
organization. The organization was basically a philosophy club 
engaged in debates and arguments. Occasionally, it had in 
attendance such eminent philosophers as Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Elizabeth Anscombe, Von Wright, Hollistscher, Julos and many 
others. In such debates, Feyerabend would defend what looks like 
the ‘absurd view’ with great assurance. 
   Feyerabend notes that Felix Ehrenhaft, whom he called ‘an 
excellent experimenter, unraveled the difficulties of ‘scientific 
rationality’ and profusely shaped his critical mind. Ehrenhaft, a 
teacher of ‘theoretical physics’, on his visit to Vienna, according to 
Feyerabend, opened his eyes and held members of the ‘Kraft circle’ 
spellbound. The ‘Kraft circle’ had heard so much about this critic 
of ‘some scientific theories’ and had conspired to criticize and 
‘expose’ him for his criticism and rejection of the relativity and 
quantum theories as being idle speculation; for, this was the theory 
which the ‘Kraft circle’ held in absolute reference and had always 
defended with all their critical might. But when Ehrenhaft visited 
the ‘Kraft circle’, he stunned them as he successfully tore apart, not  
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only the relativity and quantum theories, but the Newtonian law of 
inertia and the electromagnetic theory. Feyerabend would claim 
that Ehrenhaft’s lesson would later on provide an excellent 
illustration of the nature and limitation of scientific rationality 
(111). 
   In Vienna, Feyerabend also came under the influence of some 
foremost Marxist intellectuals like Walter Hollister. Though he 
read Stalin’s pamphlet on dialectical and historical materialism, he 
was more of ‘a raving positivist’ who favoured strict rules of 
research.  Afterwards, he converted to realism for, according to 
him, ‘realism had fruits positivism had none’ (135).  Another 
influence on Feyerabend was Elizabeth Anscombe, a powerful 
British Philosopher with whom Feyerabend claimed to have 
discussed Wittgenstein’s manuscripts.  Feyerabend actually was to 
become a student in Cambridge under Wittgenstein but the latter 
died before Feyerabend arrived in England.  Karl Popper then 
became his supervisor and, according to Feyerabend, Popper had 
‘freedom of manners…joyfully putting forth his ideas, 
unconcerned about the reaction of the professionals’ (150).  But he 
would later remark that the relatively unknown Popper whom he 
met in 1948 was very different from the ‘established Sir Karl of 
later years’. 
   Feyerabend in his studies and research in quantum theory found 
that scientists do not always follow their laid down rules during 
research, and that falsification of the rationalist was not a solution 
to the problem of scientific methodologies. By this position the 
rationalist influence of Popper on him had started to wane. 
Feyerabend would note that it was Professor Von Weizsacker who 
had the responsibility for his change to anarchism. Weizsacker 
made Feyerabend to realize that no idea, knowledge or ideology 
should be imposed without regard to circumstances, for if this is 
done, it will be more of a hindrance than help. Influenced by 
Weizsacker’s position, Feyerabend notes; 
… a person trying to solve a problem whether in science or 
elsewhere must be given a complete freedom and cannot be 
restricted by any demands, norms, however plausible they may seem 
to the logician or the philosopher who has thought them in the 
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The implication of what Feyerabend says is that every problem has 
its concrete situation and that no general rule or law formulated by 
a scientist or logician, no matter how reasonable it may appear, 
should be generalized to cover problems outside its own universe 
of discourse.  
   Another event that prompted Feyerabend to turn his back against 
rationalism had to do with the manner in which social problems 
were solved. Those who called themselves ‘intellectuals’ (a version 
of the rationalists), or ‘policy makers’ (what some Nigerians would 
call leaders of thought), make policies concerning others as if they 
were their own private affairs. They simply take it for granted that 
their ideas and those of their colleagues are the only important ones 
and that people have to adopt them (118). Feyerabend saw in such 
ideas what he would term as the tyranny of truth or reason. 
   Given this background, Feyerabend lost faith in the 
methodologies of science peddled by some of his contemporaries. 
He rather saw them as hindrances to the development of the 
individuals and the society at large. He would rather pin his faith in 
the idea of ‘anarchism’. Which he believes could enhance free 
exchange of ideas and development.  
FEYERABEND’S CRITIQUE OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM, 
CRITICAL RATIONALISM AND KUHN’S HISTORICAL AND 
REVOLUTIONARY MODEL OF SCIENCE 
Before presenting his anarchistic view of science, Feyerabend 
pointed out the loopholes inherent in other methodologies of 
science as put forward by the logical positivists, critical rationalists 
and Thomas Kuhn. 
   Taking on the logical positivists whose major tenet was the 
‘verification principle’, Feyerabend contends that theories do not 
always follow from facts in the strict sense as held by them (logical 
positivists). They had held that propositions which cannot be 
verified are meaningless and should be thrown out from the corpus 
of knowledge. Their aim was to demarcate science from non-
science, since according to them, non-scientific propositions could 
not be verified through observations. But Feyerabend explains in 
his ‘Science without Experience’ that observational knowledge is 
not the most reliable knowledge that human being possess (794). In 
this vein, Feyerabend would say that science is just one tradition  
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among many. It is closely related with other traditions and cannot 
be wholly separated from them, for it does profit from an 
admixture of unscientific ingredients (Against, 305). For him, the 
attempted separation of science from non-science is not only 
artificial but also detrimental to the achievement and growth of 
science. 
   Feyerabend’s attack on Critical Rationalism as propounded by 
Karl Popper was always devastating and revealing. Critical 
rationalism was an offshoot of logical positivism. The aim of 
critical rationalism as Uduigwomen explicitly states, was to 
‘provide the criteria for distinguishing critical and rational thinking, 
behaviour and actions from uncritical and irrational thinking, 
behaviour and actions’ (87). The method which Popper felt was 
good for this task was ‘falsification’. In the falsificationist 
methodology, theories are made to undergo some test of reasoning 
and if they cannot stand up to the critical test, such theories are 
jettisoned. According to Popper, it is a method of ‘trial and error – 
of conjectures and refutations’ (46). 
   But Feyerabend holds that Popper’s standard was too rigid and 
fixed, and that if it were to be strictly applied, then, science itself 
would be wiped out without ant suitable replacement (Against, 
176). To drive home his point, Feyerabend states that it is 
meaningless to give a negative criterion (conjectures and 
refutations or falsification) by saying that good theories are theories 
which can be refuted, but are not yet contradicted by any fact. In 
his words: 
A principle of falsification that removes theories because they do 
not fit the facts would have to remove the whole of science…facts 
alone are not strong enough for making us accept or reject scientific 
theories, the range they leave to that thought is too wide. Logic and 
methodology eliminate too much….(303) 
By implication, what Feyerabend is saying is that knowledge of 
reality cannot be limited to observational facts and cannot be 
exactly measured by a given privileged method or standard. Rigid 
test by verification, logic or scientific rationality as reveled in by 
modern science and worshipped by the rationalists and positivists 
would, if strictly applied, mean that we may be unable to find 
anything that could live up to those standards. 
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   For Imre Lakatos, whom Newton-Smith sees as ‘the revisionary 
Popperian’ (77), Feyerabend gave some little respect. According to 
Feyerabend, Lakatos does not stipulate methodological rules that 
direct the scientists to either retain or reject a theory. For 
Feyerabend, Lakatos’ ‘Scientific Research Programme’ is more 
superior to Popper’s and Kuhn’s approaches of science. Lakatos, 
for him, ‘only offers words which sound like elements of 
methodology but not methodology…’ (How to Defend, 161). For 
these reasons, Feyerabend sees Lakatos as a follow anarchist.                   
However, Lakatos could not entirely escape his critical 
sledgehammer. He criticizes Lakatos on the ground that he takes or 
upholds science against other disciplines as if modern science is 
superior to magic or myth. He maintains that science is only one 
ideology among several others. 
   On Kuhn’s Revolutionary method of science, Feyerabend says, 
‘Kuhn’s ideas are interesting, but alas, they are much too vague to 
give rise to anything, but lots of hot air’ (160). He sees Kuhn’s 
notion of ‘paradigms’, ‘normal science’, ‘crisis’, ‘revolution’, etc., 
as boring and in fact, connected with no ideas at all. Generally, 
Kuhn’s idea, according to him, is false, for there has never been 
such a period of normal science in history. He challenges anyone to 
prove the contrary (160). 
   The foregoing is a strong indication that Feyerabend did not 
favour any method of science that was couched in fixed and 
unchanging rules. Science, therefore, according to him, could only 
thrive through the anarchistic route. We shall then move to 
consider his anarchistic notion of science. 
FEYERABEND’S ANARCHISTIC CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE 
Feyerabend’s view of how science should progress is based on the 
idea of ‘Anarchism’. He opens the introductory chapter of his 
Against Method by stating that ‘Anarchism’ though not ‘the most 
attractive political philosophy is certainly excellent for 
epistemology and philosophy of science’ (17). His idea of 
anarchism is predicated on his rejection of the idea that science 
can, and should be run according to fixed universal rules. He was 
simply opposed to a certain method of science which involves firm, 
unchanging and absolutely binding principles for conducting the 
business of science; i.e. the idea of a fixed theory of rationality. He 
argues that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of  
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rationality rests on too naïve a view of man and his social 
surroundings (27). He rejects universalism because this would 
inhibit the liberty of man in leading a full and rewarding life, and 
may even inhibit man’s ways of discovering the secret of nature. 
For him, all the methodologies peddled by philosophers and 
scientists have their own limitations. He discovers that all 
important physical principles rested on methodological 
assumptions that are even violated by scientists in the course of 
research and propagation of theories. For him, the only rule that 
does not inhibit development is ‘anything goes’. However, he is apt 
to warn us that by this principle he does not recommend it as ‘the 
one and only principle of a new methodology’ (39). The principle 
of ‘anything goes’ implies that neither science is the only form of 
knowledge that has the sole right of interpreting realities nor its 
method of rationality the only route to knowledge. In view of this, 
he notes that science is not sacrosanct; nor is it possible and, in 
fact, necessary for it to be demarcated from myth, religion, 
voodooism, astrology, witchcraft and so on. Rather, science 
benefits from these categories in its interpretation and explanation 
of phenomena. 
   Feyerabend’s idea of anarchism and his principle of ‘anything 
goes’ have been variously attacked by many scholars. For example, 
it has been argued that, in a society where ‘anything goes’, the 
principle that will be at work is ‘everything stays’. Besides, his 
comparison of science with myth, voodoo, witchcraft, astrology 
and the like has been regarded as ‘unholy; (Uduigwomen, 118). 
Again, it has been held that Feyerabend’s anarchistic ideas (as a 
post-modern albatross) would imply that where ‘everything goes, 
nothing goes, for anarchy and disorder would easily become the 
order of the day’ (Ozumba, 51). 
   But it seems to me that these attacks on Feyerabend sometimes 
arise from the misconception of his usage of the term ‘anarchism’ 
and the phrase ‘anything goes’. If we consider ‘anarchism from its 
etymology ‘anarchos’, meaning, ‘without a chief or head’ or 
‘without a top authority’, (Sylvan, 218), we would see that 
Feyerabend’s usage might have been in this sense. In this sense, 
anarchism implies decentralization. It does not revel in an 
arrangement structured with a controlling centre. Relating this to 
science, we would see why Feyerabend said that science should be 
dethroned from the top pinnacle and made to occupy the ‘ordinary  
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field’ like every other forms of knowledge. And also that it should 
not be made to swallow other traditions up by presenting it and its 
paradigm of rationality as the absolute and universal standard of 
understanding realities. On the question of ‘anything goes’, 
Feyerabend, we believe, could not have used it to mean that even 
diabolical forms of knowledge, which possibly could lead to the 
extermination of humanity, should be expressly encouraged or 
allowed. Thus, when he states that ‘knowledge is a local 
commodity designed to satisfy local needs and to solve local 
problems…’ (Farewell, 28), he implies among other things that, 
each ‘locality’ has its own standard of justifying knowledge and 
perhaps the ability of developing itself. The idea here is that if any 
knowledge claim does not meet up to standards of justification in 
the locality it springs from, and cannot satisfy or solve the needs 
and problems, then it should not be taken seriously. If this is so, 
then it follows that not ‘everything stays’ even though ‘anything is 
allowed to go’ in order to prove how it can solve human problems. 
   Following his idea of anarchism and anything goes, is 
Feyerabend’s idea of proliferation of theories or ideas. This was in 
opposition to the ‘consistency principle’ of science. Scientists have 
always held that any new hypothesis or discovery should cohere or 
be consistent with already established theories. But for Feyerabend, 
this is very unreasonable because this condition would always 
preserve the older theories and not a better one. It would bring 
about a uniformity of individuals. He, however, argues that 
scientists normally go against this principle, yet it has always been 
taken for granted. Having recognized the problem of ‘consistency 
principle’, he rather calls for proliferation of theories. For him 
‘proliferation of theories is beneficial to science, while uniformity 
impairs its critical power: Uniformity also endangers the free 
development of the individual’ (Against, 35).  Feyerabend’s call for 
proliferation of theories hits hard on Popper’s recommendation of 
single theories as a unit of appraisal. His position is rather in line 
with Kuhn’s. Kuhn accepts a situation where there are many 
competing theories struggling to win general acceptance during 
what he calls the pre- paradigm or crisis period of science  
   On the idea of incommensurability, Feyerabend opposes the view 
of the rationalists. For them, a set of principles could be articulated 
for objective assessment of the relative merits of rival theories 
against a given background of evidence by way of comparing the  
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theories. In other words, the rationalist’s position is that theories 
can be compared through their respective content classes. But 
Feyerabend’s contention is that the logical relations of inclusion 
and overlap, which are required for such a comparison, cannot 
always be established between the content classes of competing 
theories. Such theories are incommensurable, and between them, 
no rational choice is possible. Here, he gives an example that the 
Newtonian mechanic is incommensurable with relativistic 
mechanics, on the ground that the later suspends a universal 
principle of the former, that shapes, masses, periods are changed 
only by physical interactions (271). 
   Feyerabend’s position again appears to be similar to that of 
Kuhn. For Kuhn, during the revolutionary period of science, the 
new paradigm is usually incompatible and incommensurable with 
the old paradigm. The implication here is that any theory differs in 
meaning in respect to its epoch and what it sets out to prove. 
Feyerabend holds that the meaning of every term depends upon the 
theoretical context in which it occurs. 
   On the concept of rationality, Feyerabend observes that scientists 
and some philosophers have blurred the original meaning of the 
term. Though he accepted that it is good to be rational, he did not 
accept the kind of rationality peddled by the scientists and 
intellectuals of his day. The common idea was that rationality was 
a universal criterion which every form of knowledge or tradition 
has to pass through in order to be accepted as legitimate 
knowledge. It was this conviction that science is the only rational 
enterprise that drove Popper and the positivists to seek a 
demarcation criterion that would distinguish science from non-
science. 
   Rationality is a word derived from reason. Thus, for a person to 
be said to be rational, he must be seen to be capable of making 
decisions and judgment based on reasons rather than emotions. 
Aristotle professed the universality of rationality when he said that 
man is by nature rational. However, rationality came to achieve 
formal, deductive and inductive rules. Aristotle, who had declared 
that ‘all men are rational’, became the first philosopher to 
systematize all forms of positive thinking which culminated in 
formal logic – the acclaimed cannon of science.  
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   In relation to this trend, Feyerabend talks of a ‘new kind of 
knowledge’ (rational) that arose in Greece and later on led to the 
sciences (Farewell, 73). Feyerabend here refers to rationality as 
theorized by those he calls ‘the founders of Western Culture’ 
namely, Aristotle, Descartes, Newton, Kant, Russell, Popper and 
Lakatos (Rationalism, 9). This form of rationality, which he 
regards as ‘Naïve’ simple means acceptance of certain procedures 
(rules, standards) together with the results of these procedures, 
rules and standards. He further notes that according to Western 
tradition, this idea of rationality does not mean ‘acceptance of 
views except in so far as the views emerge from the application of 
the procedures, rules, standards’ (8). In this regard, one becomes 
rational if and only if one’s knowledge conforms to these general 
rules and standards. 
   Feyerabend is against this idea of universalism. For him, any 
‘rational’ procedures or valid standards that run counter to socio-
logical and psychological tendencies, and that do not belong to any 
traditions are hopeless (14). What Feyerabend is saying is that 
rationality is defined by tradition or society. Each tradition may 
have its own rationality. In this light, there cannot be one general or 
universal standard of rationality to which all other forms of life, 
culture or knowledge systems must conform. Hence, for him, ‘there 
is not one rationality, there are many and it is up to us to choose the 
one we like best’ (16). 
   Feyerabend’s relativistic view here was probably a replay of 
Peter Winch’s alternative criteria to the Western type of rationality. 
Winch states: 
The criteria of logic are not a direct gift of God, but arise out of, 
and are only intelligible in the context of ways of living or modes 
of social life as such… science is one  such and religion is another; 
and each has criteria of intelligibility peculiar to itself (100). 
The point Winch is making is that there is no independent or 
absolute standard (rationality), which is compelling on all men, and 
which can, therefore, be used to measure different forms of life or 
knowledge systems. 
   If science deals with the explanation and prediction of 
phenomena, and the way the Africans conceive of, or reason about 
these realities are different from Western’s conception, then it  
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cannot be the case that, the logocentric (logic-centred) form of 
rationality (Western) world would be compelling on the Africans. 
In such a situation, we can see reason with Feyerabend’s 
conception of rationality and his philosophy of science in general 
could give Africans the leverage to finding an alternative path for 
development, thus complementing the efforts of modern science. 
Feyerabend yearns for a free society where all where all traditions, 
including science, can be made to have equal right and equal access 
to the centre of power (Science, 106). He wonders why there 
should be separation between state and religion, state and other 
forms of knowledge, but there is no separation between state and 
science. He notes that in America, for instance, a citizen can 
choose the religion he likes, yet he is not permitted to demand that 
his children learn magic, legend or astrology rather than science. 
He frowns at how the government spends more of its resources on 
the improvement of science without doing the same for other 
traditions. Science, he maintains, is just one ideology among many 
others in the society and should be treated as such.          
FEYERABEND’S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE 
BANE OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
It is a fact that Africa is underdeveloped, hence in need of 
development. Underdevelopment here does not mean absence of 
development. This, according to Rodney, is because ‘every people 
have developed in one way or another and to greater or lesser 
extent’ (21). Underdevelopment is, therefore, understood when we 
compare the levels of development between societies, nations or 
continents. 
   At this point, we define development along with McGurk as ‘the 
advancement or improvement over some primitive status’ (28). 
Considering this definition, it is a fact that Africa cannot be said to 
have remained in her ‘primitive status’, Africa has actually gone 
through some levels of development. But when this is compared to 
the developmental strides in the Western world, especially in terms 
of science, technology and education, we certainly would agree that 
we are underdeveloped. 
   In her quest for development, Africa has seriously been 
influenced by the Western paradigm of development, which hinges 
on the purely rational/scientific outlook. Many have even argued  
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that Africa can only develop if it discards her cultural and primitive 
scientific categories. For example, Wiredu in his Philosophy and 
an African Culture advocates the application of the method and 
result of modern science for the improvement of the condition of 
human life (43). This involves, according to him, the discarding of 
certain superstitious beliefs and customs that inhibit scientific 
growth. In view of this he advocates an education blueprint where 
the ‘rational, analytical and scientific orientation’ is propagated 
(15). He opines: 
‘Our children should be initiated early in life into the discipline of 
formal and informal logic and into the methodology of rational 
thinking…, the kind of training that will produce minds… capable 
of logical analysis and fully aware of the nature and value of exact 
measurement’ (15-16).  
We quite agree with Wiredu that modern science is an 
important agent for national development in Africa. We may 
also agree with Wiredu that certain traditional cultures may 
inhibit African development. But this is not enough reason to 
claim that the logocentric rational methodology of the West is 
the only paradigm of interpreting phenomena; nor is it the only 
route to harnessing the path of development. 
   Feyerabend as we stated earlier, was against such imposition of 
the methodology of modern science (as Wiredu seems to do). This, 
according to Feyerabend, would blur or impair the free 
development of the indigenous outlook of the people. This is 
exactly what is happening to Africa. Before the advent of the 
modern science and its application – technology, the Africans had 
ideas on how to brew beer, distil local gin, preserve corpses, weave 
clothes, make pots of different shapes, colours and sizes, build 
houses, make astronomical observations, heal diseases of different 
types through herbs and roots, rear cattle and do so many other 
things. But what has happened to these indigenous scientific 
traditions today?  Some of them have been lost because of the 
influence of ‘Western scientific paradigm’. The result is that Africa 
has been derided as an underdeveloped continent because it has 
failed to build on those ‘ancient civilizations’ strides. It has, rather, 
caved in under the Western influence. Ivan Sertima, writing on the 
Lost Sciences of Africa, rues the African situation by stating that 
even though it has been discovered (in the past few years) that 
Africa had great scientific traditions, ‘ it is quite clear that the finest  
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heart of the African world receded into the shadow while its broken 
bones were put on spectacular display’ (26). The implication of this 
is that African glorious-scientific achievements of the past are not 
recognized because its dependence and underdeveloped status have 
overwhelmed such achievements.. 
   The implication of Feyerabend’s philosophy of science for 
African development, following the above thinking, is that we 
should re-examine our attitudes towards such scientific traditions 
of the past and perhaps build from that to create indigenous 
scientific and technological traditions like the Chinese, Indians and 
Japanese have successfully done. This is why he challenges that 
‘primitive thinkers showed greater insight into the nature of 
knowledge than their enlightened philosophical (scientific) rivals. 
It is, therefore, necessary to examine our attitude towards… all 
those ideas which rationalists would like to see forever removed 
from the surface of the earth’ (Against, 298-9). Professor Nyong’o 
in his lecture ‘Technology, Culture and National Development in 
Africa’ quoted Professor Bassey Andah as saying that our 
traditional and technological systems were and still remain viable 
on which we can build our future (19). This, according to him, 
means that these systems were compatible with local cultures. 
   Another implication of Feyerabend’s philosophy of science is 
that it challenges Africa to develop alternatives to scientific 
knowledge of the West. Feyerabend repeatedly (in fact, in almost 
all his writings) says that neither science nor its method is the only 
form of, or paradigm to genuine knowledge. In his Three 
Dialogues on Knowledge, Feyerabend says that one has to find 
different methods to obtain different kinds of knowledge (57). The 
implication here is that there cannot be one fixed method for doing 
science. That is why he explains in his ‘How to be Good 
Empiricist’ that though empiricism has been taken as the core of 
the sciences (3), it will be futile to attempt to make it (empiricism) 
a universal basis of all our factual knowledge (8).  
   Feyerabend’s position here lends credence to some trado-medical 
sciences in Africa. For example, K. Ojong tells us of traditional 
orthopaedic practice in Yala and Boki areas of the northern part of 
Cross River State of Nigeria. Here, they use both the metaphysical 
and empirical knowledge to treat fractured or broken bones. In 
treating a fractured bone, the traditional orthopaedic doctor would  
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proceed by breaking the leg of a cockerel (if he is treating the 
fractured leg of a male patient) or the leg of a hen (if he is treating 
the fractured leg of a female patient). As he ‘sets’ or treats the leg 
of the cockerel or hen, and as soon as it gets well, the male or 
female human patient would, correspondingly, become healed 
(174). The significant thing here is that the ‘orthopaedic doctor’ 
may not even get to touch the legs of the human patient involved. 
What he does is just to treat through a medium, which the 
traditional Africans call ‘forces’. 
   The fact is that this type of medicine certainly defies explanation 
in Western logic and scientific rationality. The Western-minded 
scientist may be left to wonder about the relationship between 
cockerel or hen and the human patients, or how the medication on 
the cockerel or hen is transmitted to the human beings without any 
visible contact. Meanwhile, we should note that Feyerabend seems 
to give credence to this type of medicine when he states that 
‘…some forms of tribal medicine may have better ways of 
diagnosing and treating (mental and physical) illness than scientific 
medicine of today’ (Science, 9). It is true that such forms of 
traditional medicine abound in Africa. But the problem is that they 
are not carried out on such a large scale as to give Western 
medicine a serious challenge. However, it is also true that when 
measured against the logic of modern science, such traditional 
medicine would readily be seen to be fraught with some mysteries. 
Though we should encourage research into these types of medicine, 
it does not mean that the rationality of modern science or its 
method must be imposed on them. The major concern should be 
whether it can solve human problems without causing any 
nuisance. If it does, then such medicine and the like should be 
encouraged. We think it could provide alternatives to modern 
medical treatment such that everyone can make a choice where and 
what form of treatment he is to receive. Besides, the profession of 
the traditional healers would be boosted. This can then take care of 
the spiritual needs, social needs and even physical needs of the 
wider range of people in the continent. 
   Following the above viewpoint, we can point out another 
implication of Feyerabend’s philosophy of science for African 
development. The implication is that the government should be 
ready to provide funds for researches and development of ‘ethno-
science’ (local sciences). It is a known fact that most Africans do  
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not give the same support to ‘local sciences’ as they do to modern 
science. Feyerabend frowns at the situation where modern science 
and the state work closely together while other forms of knowledge 
are left alone to lick their wounds. He notes that while scientific 
subjects are compulsory subjects in schools, no interest is shown by 
government in such subjects as astrology, magic, legends, myths 
etc. yet, science benefits a great deal from these non-scientific 
subjects. In short, he would want these forms of knowledge to also 
have free and equal access to the seat of power (106). 
   Nevertheless, sound as Feyerabend’s challenge above may 
appear, the problem in most African countries is whether the 
custodian of  this ‘ethno-science’ will be willing to carry out, or aid 
such researches and at least make the result known to government 
and the public or not. The concomitant questions are: will the 
traditional healer open up on his secrets? Will the bone setter (such 
as we mentioned above), let us know how his medicine, for 
example, on the broken leg of cockerel or hen lead to an effective 
cure of human patient?  Will the traditional rain-maker tell us the 
secrets of how he can send down the rain or stop it, or how he can 
relocate thunder to specific targets? (Alozie, 9). The above posers 
lead us into the problem of secrecy in ethno-science in Africa, a 
major problem that has demeaned local sciences. This is why 
Kwame Gyekye notes that the refusal of the custodians of the 
verities and secrets of nature to open up on how they achieve their 
feats has led to the demise of what could have passed for credible 
scientific knowledge on the death of such ‘custodians’. According 
to him, this is why the development of science has stagnated (30).   
   Gyekye’s observation is quite correct. Even in this contemporary 
world, it is not uncommon to see an African traditional healer 
being so esoteric and personal about his knowledge claims, such 
that on his or her death, such knowledge would just evaporate into 
thin air. To stop this ugly trend, it is government’s place to call the 
custodians of such knowledge and make provisions for these 
subjects to be taught in schools. In fact, the custodian of such 
ethno-sciences should even lead the charge for sciences to be 
introduced in schools. After all, Feyerabend says in his Science in a 
Free Society that in any democratic society, the citizen has a say in 
what should be taught in schools, whether folk-medicine, astrology 
or voodooism, etc (86). The implication of this is that the citizens 
of such a society would have seen the usefulness of such forms of  
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knowledge in the development of their spiritual and material well 
being. If this is done, we believe that such forms of knowledge will 
be properly projected. Thus, we will be talking about 
‘exotericization’ of knowledge rather than ‘esotericization’. This of 
course, is one important implication of Feyerabend’s philosophy of 
science for African development. 
   Apart from the above, another implication of Feyerabend’s 
philosophy of science is that he encourages a shift from 
logocentricism to functionality. This means that the justification of 
scientific knowledge should no more be based on whether it 
conforms to the logic and rationality of modern science or not, but 
whether it can solve human problems. This is why he states in 
Farewell to Reason that knowledge (science) is a local commodity 
designed to satisfy local needs and to solve local problems (28). 
This means that Africans can build their own mode of scientific 
development instead of being over dependent on the paradigm of 
the Western world. 
   Furthermore, Feyerabend’s philosophy of science poses a serious 
advice to African nations to be wary of the kind of technology and 
science they import into the continent. The fact is that not all 
scientific and technological knowledge is congenial to the African 
world view. It is a fact of life that some of these imported 
technological devices have more or less help to erode or reduce our 
moral value to a near zero mark. The Africans, at least, in the 
traditional setting, are known to be highly superior in morals than 
their counterparts. But what are we seeing today? Some Africans 
have gone haywire in perpetrating acts of immoralities because of 
influence of modern science and technology. This is why 
Feyerabend in his Three Dialogues on Knowledge explains that 
Western civilization (science)  ‘may have done some good here and 
there, for example, in the restriction of infectious diseases – but the 
blind assumption that Western ideas and technology are 
intrinsically good and can therefore be imposed without any 
consultation of local conditions was a disaster’ (74). 
   Indeed, one can only be left to reflect on the moral disaster we 
have been plunged into by jumping into, or swallowing everything 
Western, as far as it is scientific and technological. Apart from this, 
many African countries are involved in the attempt to develop 
through inappropriate and incongruous technology as a result of  
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what Professor Nyong’o calls ‘Apish imitation and misuse of 
resources’. He cites an example of where an American firm was 
contracted by Kenyan Government to expand a sugar mill without 
giving adequate thought to its peculiar environment (which include 
physical, social, cultural and even economical). Though the 
expansion has been carried out, ‘not a single extra ton of cane had 
been processed through the factory’ (20). According to Nyong’o, 
the reason is that: ‘The wheels of the tractors were so big that they 
could neither travel on the access roads in the farms nor could they 
fit on the bridges!’ Today, according to him, ‘The tractors and all 
other machines lay in the compound that now looked like a 
cemetery of abandoned metals’ (20). This is the malady in African 
countries: Blind imitation without adequate learning! 
                                       
                                      CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion was an attempt to draw out the 
implications of Feyerabend’s philosophy of science for African 
development. We have found out that the Africa’s over-dependence 
on the Western paradigm has to some extent impaired the Africans 
from developing through their own indigenous mode. This is not to 
say that modern science, as projected by the West, does not 
contribute African development. It does, but it has its own 
loopholes when we place it side by side with the African view of 
the world. This is why we corroborate Kanu’s position that 
Feyerabend’s philosophy of science could provide a ‘philosophical 
blueprint’ for African development, since it challenges Africa to 
use its resources (as based on their own view of the world) to build 
her own scientific and technological empire instead of over-
dependence on the West (6-9). 
   The important fact about Feyerabend’s philosophy of science is 
that it is not an exclusivist philosophy, especially when compared 
with other philosophies of science. His philosophy of science takes 
into consideration a people’s view of the world and their existential 
conditions to the extent of challenging them to develop from their 
local perspectives. This challenge based on his philosophical pillars 
of ‘anarchism’, ‘anything goes’, ‘proliferation of ideas’, 
‘rationality’ and many others mentioned in this work attest the  
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humanitarian, liberal and emancipator nature of his philosophy of 
science. 
   In the light of this discussion, it is our thinking that Feyerabend’s 
ideas are veritable pointers to the way Africa can develop by not 
being swallowed up by Western paradigm, but in complementary 
effort with the achievements of modern science. Such a situation 
can lead to a greater rate of development in Africa.                 
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